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Arnold v. Kip, 123 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 41 (October 11, 2007) 1
CIVIL PROCEDURE – DISMISSAL UNDER NRCP 16.1(e)(2)
Summary
Appeal from a district court order dismissing a medical malpractice action.
Disposition/Outcome
Affirmed the district court’s order dismissing the medical malpractice action
because of a failure to timely file under NRCP 16.1(e)(2).
Factual and Procedural History
Paul and Elizabeth Arnold filed a medical malpractice claim against Phelps C.
Kip, M.D. in July 2003, for allegedly negligent surgery on Paul’s spine nearly two years
earlier. They served him with a summons and complaint, and Dr. Kip timely filed an
answer denying liability, after which the parties conducted an early case conference
under NRCP 16.1(e)(1).
On August 6, 2004, Dr. Kip moved to dismiss the action without prejudice
because the Arnolds had failed to file a case conference report within 240 days of service
of summons and complaint, pursuant to NRCP 16.1(e)(2). Because he had been served
with a summons and complaint on November 24, 2003, Dr. Kip argued that the deadline
for filing the case conference report had expired in late July, 2004, and the Arnolds’ lack
of explanation for their lapse in filing amounted to a failure to facilitate discovery.
The Arnolds argued that their claim should not be dismissed because their failure
to timely file was inadvertent; they had made all oral disclosures required under NRCP
16.1(a) at the early case conference; Dr. Kip had not asked about the filing prior to his
motion to dismiss, and Dr. Kip had received a copy of the case conference report on
August 17, 2004.
On September 30, 2004, the district court granted Dr. Kips’s motion, dismissing
the case without prejudice. The court distinguished the case from Dougan v.
Gustaveson, 2 in which the court said it would be unduly harsh to dismiss the case when
the defendants had been given an open extension to file their answers. Here, however,
Dr. Kip had neither requested nor received a time extension and therefore had not caused
the discovery delay. The Arnolds also had not explained their delay in filing. Quoting
Dougan, the district court said that lengthy delays inhibit the “timely and efficient
processing of cases,” a goal of NRCP 16.1(e)(2). 3 Therefore, although courts generally
seek to decide a case on its merits, the Arnolds’ noncompliance warranted dismissal. The
Arnolds moved for reconsideration and offered a new excuse and argument for failure to
file the report. The district court denied the motion, and the Arnolds appealed.
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Discussion
Abuse of Discretion
The Arnolds argued that the lower court had abused its discretion in granting Dr.
Kip’s motion to dismiss, but the court found the assertion without merit. The court had
not previously articulated the standard for reviewing orders granting motions to dismiss
under NRCP 16.1(e)(2). However, the court noted its prior holding that sanctions for
pretrial conference noncompliance under NRCP 16(f) were within the district court’s
discretion. 4 The court accordingly announced that it would apply the abuse of discretion
standard in reviewing the district court’s order for a motion to dismiss under NRCP
16.1(e)(2).
The Arnolds argued that the lower court had abused its discretion because under
Dougan, 5 the dismissal of their claims was an overly harsh sanction for their failure to
timely file their report. They argued, although the 2004 version of NRCP 16.1(e)(2)
allowed a district court to dismiss an action without prejudice sua sponte or upon the
defendant’s motion if the plaintiff failed to file a case conference report within 240 days
after service of summons and complaint upon the defendant, 6 Dr. Kip suffered no
prejudice due to the late filing.
However, the court distinguished the case from Dougan, where the appellant had
not timely filed a case conference report only after the respondent had been granted an
open extension of time to file answers. 7 In Dougan, it would have been “fruitless” to
proceed with a case conference because matters were not yet at issue, the answers having
been filed well after the passing of the case conference deadline. 8 Because the delay had
been made to accommodate the respondent’s request, the respondents did not claim that
they suffered prejudice. 9 The Dougan court narrowed its holding, noting that an “overly
strict application of the rule” would be against the interests of justice. 10
Here, the court ruled that generally, the party moving for dismissal under NRCP
16.1(e)(2) need not show prejudice, and the district court need not consider whether the
delay in case conference filing has resulted in prejudice to the defendant. Without such a
ruling, plaintiffs would have been able to exceed the deadline for filing a case conference
report whenever the defendant could not show prejudice.
The court also set forth a factors test under which the district court could use its
discretion to determine whether to dismiss an action without prejudice for plaintiff’s
failure to comply with NRCP 16.1(e)(2). The non-exhaustive list included the length of
the delay; whether the defendant induced or caused the delay; whether prosecution of the
case was impeded by the delay; considerations of case management, such as compliance
with scheduling orders or trial dates; and whether the plaintiff had good cause for delay.
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The court also held that the district court is not required to consider whether the
expiration of the statute of limitations would prevent the plaintiff from pursuing his claim
after an NRCP 16.1(e)(2) dismissal. The district court should not consider the
consequences to the plaintiff but instead consider the purpose of NRCP 16.1(e)(2), which
is to promote timeliness of prosecution and to permit sanctions for failure to comply with
the rule.
Motion for reconsideration
The Arnolds filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that the district court
applied an incorrect standard in allowing dismissal and should have instead looked to
other factors. However, the court noted that the district court had considered the
Arnolds’ motion and denied it on its merits.
The court considered whether it could, in deciding the appeal, consider arguments
made for the first time on reconsideration. The court held that it could do so, given two
requirements: 1) the reconsideration order and motion were properly part of the record on
appeal from the final judgment, and 2) the district court elected to consider the motion on
its merits. In reaching its conclusion, the court first noted that prior cases provided
unclear guidance. In Las Vegas Police Protective Ass’n v. Dist. Court, 11 the justices
considered the arguments without discussion. In Rico v. Rodriguez, 12 the court stated
that the arguments must be part of the record on appeal to be considered. Furthermore,
while Ross v. Carson Construction, 13 and NOLM, LLC v. County of Clark, 14 both held
that the court need not but may consider the arguments, the arguments were considered in
Ross, but not in NOLM.
Therefore, the court looked to the particulars of the instant case and held that if
the reconsideration order and motion are a proper part of the record on appeal after the
district court considered the motion on its merits, then the court was permitted to consider
the arguments from the reconsideration motion during appeal. Here, the Arnolds filed the
motion for reconsideration pursuant to District Court Rule (DCR) 13(7), permitting the
filing without leave of the court. Under Washoe District Court Rule 12(8), which
incorporated DCR 13(7) and provided deadlines for reconsideration, the district court
considered the Arnolds’ motion for reconsideration and denied it upon its merits. The
denial was entered before the Arnolds’ notice of appeal and thus the reconsideration
motion and order were properly part of the appeal. The notice was timely filed under
NRAP 4(a)(1), which required filing thirty days after the service of the dismissal order’s
entry. Therefore, the court could consider the arguments.
The court next considered the Arnolds’ argument that the expiration of the statute
of limitations meant that the district court’s dismissal without prejudice was effectively
dismissal with prejudice. However, the court found that the district court dismissed the
claim without prejudice under NRCP 16.1(e)(2) and was not obligated to consider the
effect of the statute of limitations. Therefore, contrary to the Arnolds’ argument, it was
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not appropriate to apply Young v. Johnny Rieiro Bldg., 15 where the court held that,
although it normally reviewed discovery sanctions under an abuse of discretion standard,
it applied a heightened standard when the sanction was dismissed with prejudice. The
sanctions in Young were imposed under NRCP 37, 16 for failure to make disclosures or to
cooperate during discovery, and they were made as an express order of dismissal with
prejudice. 17 Here, the district court dismissed without prejudice, therefore, the
heightened standard was not appropriate.

Conclusion
The court held that the district court does not abuse its discretion in dismissing an action
under NRCP 16.1(e)(2) for a plaintiff’s failure to timely file a case conference report
without prejudice, after the plaintiff fails to give any reason for the untimely filing. A
district court considering dismissal under NRCP 16.1(e)(2) is not required to apply a
heightened standard of review or assess the factors from Young, which only apply to
cases in which dismissal with prejudice occurs. The district court should consider the
rule’s purpose – to promote the timely prosecution of litigation.
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